THE WAGE PENALTY FOR MOTHERHOOD
Does motherhood affect a woman's wages? We provide evidence of such a penalty for the cohort of American women currently in their childbearing years, and investigate its causes.
Five explanations for the association between motherhood and lower wages have been offered. First, many women spend time at home caring for children, interrupting their job experience, or at least interrupting full-time employment. This affects wages because job experience and seniority have positive returns. Second, mothers may trade off higher wages for "motherfriendly" jobs that are easier to combine with parenting. Third, mothers may earn less because the needs of their children leave them exhausted or distracted at work, making them less productive. Fourth, employers may discriminate against mothers. Finally, perhaps the association is not really a penalty resulting from motherhood and its consequences at all. In this view, what appear to be causal effects of having children in cross-sectional research may be spurious; some of the same unmeasured factors (such as career ambition) that discourage child bearing may increase earnings.
We build on Waldfogel's 1997 study. She uses a fixed-effects model to avoid spuriousness. Analyzing panel data spanning 1968 to 1988, after controlling for marital status, experience, and education, she finds a penalty of 6 percent for one child and 13 percent for two or more children. (She does not provide information on the size of the motherhood effect before partialling out that portion caused by motherhood reducing job experience.) We use a similar statistical model, and analyze more recent data that goes through 1993, including more detailed measures to assess whether the loss of full-time experience and seniority caused by motherhood explains most of the penalty. Ours is the first analysis to distinguish between the four categories of full-time experience and seniority and part-time experience and seniority. (Seniority refers to experience with one's present employer.) We also include a measure of number of employment breaks. We also attempt to assess how much, if any, of the motherhood penalty results because mothers choose or are confined to lower paying but more "mother-friendly" jobs. We do this by adding controls for a large number of job characteristics. We also add to past studies an examination of whether the motherhood penalty varies by marital status. This is important since a growing number of mothers are single.
WHY CARE ABOUT THE PENALTY FOR CARE?
Why is the question of a wage penalty for motherhood of interest from the point of view of either social theory or public policy? One reason is its relevance for larger issues of gender inequality. Most women are mothers, and women do most of the work of child rearing. Thus, any "price" of being a mother that is not experienced by fathers will affect many women and contribute to gender inequality. Of course, lower pay for employed mothers at one point in time is only the tip of the iceberg. Lifetime earnings are also lowered for those women who have a period with no earnings because they stay home caring for children full time (Davies and Joshi 1995; Joshi 1990) . Gender inequality in earnings affects other gender inequalities. Lifetime earnings affect private pension income. For married women, lower earnings may affect their bargaining power with their husbands (England and Kilbourne 1990; Schwartz and Blumstein 1983) . For the growing proportion of women who are single mothers, the motherhood penalty contributes to the gap in poverty rates between households headed by a single woman and those containing an adult male (McLanahan and Kelly 1999) .
Mothers have very high rates of employment today; for example, over 40% of women with children under a year of age are in the labor force (Klerman and Leibowitz 1999) .
Nonetheless, many women still lose at least some employment time to childrearing (Klerman and Leibowitz 1999) . One explanation of the wage penalty for motherhood is based on this fact; some mothers take time out of employment, and experience affects present wages. Human capital theory predicts that experience and seniority have positive returns because they involve on-the-job training that makes workers more productive. Workers are seen to pay for a part of this training with an initially lower wage; employers are seen to raise wages with seniority to retain more productive, experienced workers. A return to experience is also compatible with institutional theories that see the reward as a result of organizational policies and inertia that reward experience for reasons other than its link to productivity. Either view implies that mothers will earn less if they lose any job time in child rearing.
There is no clear conclusion from past studies about what part of the child penalty is explained by experience, because some authors report only penalties with or without controls for experience, and studies vary in how they measure experience. An early study by Hill (1979:589) found that controlling for experience and tenure explained all the negative effect of children on women's pay. Lundberg and Rose (2000) find a 5 percent penalty for women's first birth without controlling for experience, but were only interested in the gross penalty so did not add controls for experience. Waldfogel (1997:214) finds a penalty net of experience (6 percent for one child, going to 4 percent if controls for whether current job is part-time and how much of past experience is part-time are added). But she doesn't report the gross penalty that includes effects of experience (this would be obtained by leaving experience out of the regression). Korenman and Neumark (1992:246-47) found no net or gross penalty for motherhood; they found no difference in wage change across a two-year period (1980) (1981) (1982) between women who had experienced a birth during the period and those who had not, whether or not women's experience during that interval was controlled. Perhaps the two-year interval they examined was too short for the effects of motherhood on wages to show up. None of the prior studies have distinguished full-from part-time experience and whether the experience is general (i.e., with any employer) or is seniority with the current employer. But these types of experience may differ in their returns. Corcoran et al. (1984) found smaller returns to part-time than full-time experience. Waldfogel (1997) distinguishes between full-and part-time experience, and finds almost identical returns. But she doesn't distinguish between general experience and seniority with one's current employer. Korenman and Neumark (1992) make this distinction but not between full-versus part-time within either category. Waldfogel (1997) also distinguished between whether the woman's current job was part-time, but Korenman and Neumark (1992) did not. Hill's (1979) analysis makes most of these distinctions (not whether seniority was part-time or not), but uses much older data (1976) , and uses an OLS statistical model that does not control for unobserved differences between mothers and nonmothers.
We distinguish between full-time experience, part-time experience, full-time seniority, and part-time seniority, and add a measure of the number of employment breaks the woman has taken. The rationale for including this is that continuity may count; that is, among women with equal experience, those with more continuous experience may have higher earnings. This is suggested by Felmlee's (1995) analysis of 1968-1973 data. She showed that women who changed employers but maintained continuous employment (defined as a break of no more than a month) were less likely to take a fall and more likely to see an increase in wages, compared to women who were out of the labor force between jobs. We will examine the "gross" motherhood penalty, and then estimate a "human capital model" with all these measures of experience controlled.
Motherhood Reducing Job Effort and Productivity
According to human capital theory, the reason losing job experience would adversely affect mothers' wages is that they are less productive; that is, it is because more experienced workers are more productive that they are paid more. Here we wish to consider a possible link between motherhood and productivity that would exist even among women with equal human capital. The argument for this link comes from the "new home economics" of Gary Becker (1991) . Mothers may be less productive on the job because they are tired from home duties, or because they are "storing" energy for anticipated work at home. The assumption is that nonmothers spend more of their non-employment hours in leisure rather than childcare or other household work, and that leisure takes less energy, and thus leaves more energy for paid work.
In this same vein, mothers may spend some time while they are at work worrying about their children, calling them at home, or scheduling appointments for them. They may take sick leave for children's illnesses. Mothers may also choose or be relegated to less demanding occupations because of this extra burden of the second shift. This second mechanism, operating via occupational choice or placement, is explored in a later section on "mother-friendly" jobs.
No one has directly measured the effort or productivity of mothers versus nonmothers, or men versus women. Prior research has approached this indirectly. Bielby and Bielby (1988) analyzed data from a national survey that asked respondents how "hard" their jobs require them to work, how much "effort, either physical or mental" their jobs require, and how much "effort they put into their jobs beyond what is required." (We use occupational averages from these two variables in our analysis.) Women reported slightly more effort than men. This is striking since other research finds that men generally overestimate and women underestimate their merit or performance (Colwill 1982) . As far as we know, no one has compared mothers to nonmothers on effort measures. Since it is women's responsibility for the care of children that is presumed to create differences in effort between women and men, the lack of sex differences in effort in past research suggest that mothers and other women may not differ in effort either.
We, too, lack measures of productivity or effort and are forced to see this explanation of the motherhood penalty as consistent with a residual effect of motherhood not explained by other variables for which we have measures.
Low Wages in Mother-Friendly Jobs: Compensating Differentials
Mothers may seek "mother-friendly" jobs. The features of these jobs that make them easier to combine with motherhood may compensate for their lower earnings. This is what economists' theory of compensating differentials predicts. For example, following Becker's (1991) line of thought, mothers may choose jobs that require less energy. Or mothers may choose jobs with parent-friendly characteristics, such as flexible hours, few demands for weekend or evening work or travel, on-site day care, or availability of a phone to check on children. The theory of compensating differentials states that competition will eventually require all jobs to be equally attractive to the worker at the margin when pecuniary (wage) and nonpecuniary benefits are both taken into account. In this view, employers can fill jobs for lower wages if they offer nonpecuniary amenities that some workers will trade off against wages, and how much the amenity will reduce the market wage is determined by the preferences of the worker at the margin (England 1992:69-72) . "Mother-friendliness" is just one of many types of nonpecuniary amenities that the theory predicts might compensate for lower wages. If mothers are more willing to trade off wages for "mother-friendly" jobs than other workers, then they will earn less.
The most obvious mother-friendly job characteristic is being able to work part-time in the job. Waldfogel (1997) found that, net of experience and education, the wage penalty of 6 percent for having one child was reduced to 4 percent when she added a control for whether the job was part-time and whether past experience was part-time. The penalty for two or more children was reduced from 15 percent to 12 percent by this same control.
No one has tested whether or how much other job characteristics explain the motherhood penalty. However, two studies used the Quality of Employment Study (QES) data, which contain workers' self-reports of characteristics of their jobs, to explore whether women or mothers are especially likely to be employed in parent-friendly jobs. Glass (1990) found that predominantly male jobs had more flexible schedules, unsupervised break time, and paid sick leave and vacation, all features we might see as parent-friendly. Glass and Camarigg (1992) constructed indices of schedule flexibility and ease of job performance. Among workers employed roughly full-time, and net of education, experience, tenure, marital status, and firm size, mothers were no more likely to be in jobs with these characteristics, nor were these characteristics more common for those in predominantly female occupations.
Our approach is to enter a number of characteristics of respondents' occupations, industries, firms, or jobs into our models to see if these explain any of the motherhood penalty.
Direct measures of features of jobs that make them more compatible with parenting would be ideal-for example whether they allow flexible hours or choice about overtime, provide on-site day care, or allow parents to make personal phone calls during work. But few such measures exist, especially on national probability samples. Given data limitations, our strategy must be more indirect-to try a large number of available job measures, entering them into our models to see if they explain any motherhood penalty we find. The hope is that our broad array of job characteristics includes features that determine or correlate with mother-friendliness, even if they are not direct measures of this construct.
One approach we take is to see if mothers are employed in more heavily "female" jobs, and if this explains part of the lower earnings of mothers. Prior research shows that "female" jobs pay less than "male" jobs, even after controls for skill levels (England 1992; Kilbourne et al. 1994) . Is some portion of the reduced wages of female jobs a differential compensating for "mother-friendly" features not controlled for in previous analyses? The research of Glass (1990) and Glass and Camarigg (1992) , discussed above, does not support this idea that "female" jobs are more conducive to parenting. Desai and Waite (1991) explored the possibility that "female" jobs are mother-friendly indirectly by examining whether they helped women stay employed continuously around a birth. They did not find that women who worked in occupations with a higher percent female stayed employed longer during their pregnancies or returned to work sooner after a birth. The only evidence we know of that suggests that predominantly female jobs are more "mother-friendly" jobs is Okamoto and England's (1999) finding that mothers are employed in occupations with a higher percent female than other women. We will assess whether the sex composition of jobs explains any of the motherhood penalty.
Glass and colleagues (Glass and Estes 1997; Glass and Fujimoto 1995; Glass and Riley 1998) have explored employer policies that are "mother-friendly." Their work leads us to suspect that larger firms and public sector organizations offer more family-friendly policies, whereas unions have equivocal effects (more leave provision, but less child care aid). Glass and her colleagues as well as Presser (1995) suggest that mothers use self-employment to accommodate child care responsibilities. Mothering may also be accommodated by working in child care, either because it is done at home or because the mother can enroll her child where she works, sometimes at a discount. Our strategy is to include as many job characteristics as we can to see if they explain some of the wage penalty for motherhood.
Employer Discrimination against Mothers
Another possible explanation of the motherhood penalty is employer discrimination in the form of treating women differently because of their motherhood status, such that mothers are placed in less rewarding jobs, promoted less, or paid less within jobs. This is distinct from sex discrimination that is based on the probabilistic assumption that most women are or will become mothers. The latter creates a sex gap in pay, but not a gap between mothers and other women.
Economists' discussions of discrimination distinguish between discrimination based on tastes and statistical discrimination. In the "taste" model applied to motherhood, an employer has no assumption about mothers' lesser productivity, but simply finds it distasteful to employ them.
Sometimes it is coworkers or customers who have the taste, and employers find it expensive to offend them. If such differential treatment of mothers exists, it should show up in our models as a residual effect of motherhood after human capital and mother-friendliness of jobs has been controlled. (Of course prior discrimination could affect the accumulation of experience, encouraging labor force withdrawals.) Or if some of the motherhood penalty is reduced by controlling for job characteristics that determine reward level, discrimination could be implicated in why mothers were relegated to lower paying jobs; in this case discrimination could explain more than just the residual penalty after controlling for job characteristics.
A second model is statistical discrimination. Suppose that, net of types of human capital that employers can cheaply screen on such as education and experience, mothers are less productive, on average. The statistical discrimination model is part of economists' consideration of costs of information. The idea is that it is expensive to measure individual productivity before hire, so employers use averages formed by informal or formal data gathering to make predictions about individuals. They might then treat women with (more) children less favorably. In economists' thinking, they would create about the degree of pay gap between mothers and nonmothers (or any other two groups to whom statistical discrimination applies) that is commensurate with the productivity gap. In most models of statistical discrimination offered by economists, the group that is discriminated against is paid, on average, approximately commensurate with the groups' average productivity, whereas in taste discrimination the group's average pay is less than their average productivity.
1 Of course, individual mothers who are more productive than the average mother are being paid less than commensurate with their productivity in such a scheme. How would this show up in our regression models? If we had accurate measures of individuals' productivity (measures assumed to be expensive for employers to get before hire), productivity were controlled, and statistical discrimination were the only source of the motherhood penalty, we would find a coefficient of 0 for children. However, if productivity is unmeasured, then the regression coefficient for children would pick up any statistical or taste discrimination. Social psychological research on stereotyping suggests that a more realistic model similar to statistical discrimination features employers observing real differences, exaggerating them, and thus producing an average pay gap between groups more than commensurate with group differences in productivity. It is also possible to have erroneous perceptions of group differences where none exist. These types of discrimination would show up in the residual effect of motherhood.
U.S. federal law prohibits sex and race discrimination in two forms. Differential treatment cases involve treating women differently than men because of their sex rather than any individual qualification. This standard prohibits taste or statistical discrimination. Above, we have been discussing differential treatment of mothers. U.S. law does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on parenthood, but if differential treatment on the basis of parenthood were applied only applied to women, courts might well see this as sex discrimination, provided that qualifications and productivity were equivalent between the groups of women.
A second kind of legal claim of sex or race discrimination involves disparate impact.
This doctrine says that policies are considered discriminatory and illegal if they use some screening criterion for hire or promotion that screens out more women and the screening criterion is not a "business necessity." Business "necessity" is defined quite loosely to include anything that gets more productive workers or reduces costs. Consider an analogous concept of policies that have a disparate impact on mothers. Policies that require long or inflexible hours, do not allow sick days for children or phone calls from the job, and do not save a woman's job until she returns from time at home after a birth will adversely affect mothers. A disparate impact claim of discrimination against mothers parallel to the present legal standard regarding sex and race would prohibit any such policies, unless having them saves employers money or increases output. Acker's (1990) and Williams' (1995) notion of gendered organizations can be seen as a kind of disparate impact model. They argue that many workplace policies are gendered in that they were formed around an idealized image of a male worker who has a wife at home and no family responsibilities other than to contribute money. Few people, male or female, have a full time homemaker backing them up today, but some careers have requirements that seem most consistent with this gendered image. Such policies probably do have a disparate impact on mothers, and as such have a disparate impact by sex. But most such policies would probably not be deemed discriminatory by the courts because, despite their disparate impact, they probably get more output from the employee, and thus employers could probably meet their burden of proof under the loosely defined "business necessity" standard.
But we might be interested in a broader notion of disparate impact discrimination than courts would allow. Thus, we can ask where the effects of policies that have a disparate impact on mothers would show up in our statistical models. They should affect the motherhood penalty net of experience (although to the extent that experience is endogenous to such policies, which may force women out of employment upon a birth, this could be an underestimate). Effects of policies that limit mothers to lower paying (more mother-friendly) jobs would be netted out if relevant job characteristics are controlled.
The foregoing discussion should serve to as a caveat that how to interpret motherhood effects net of human capital depends on a number of assumptions. Given the various provisos discussed above, researchers' inability to measure productivity or employer discrimination directly means that either may show up in our analysis as an unmeasured residual effect of motherhood on wages.
Spurious "Effects" of Motherhood on Wages Due to Unmeasured Heterogeneity
It is possible that there is no causal effect of motherhood on wages, but rather that some of the same individual characteristics that cause lower earnings also lead to child-bearing at higher rates. For example, women with lower academic skills may be more likely to get pregnant early, because they know their career prospects are not good and thus they think children will yield more satisfaction. Or perhaps women who care less about affluence are more likely to have (more) children and are more apt to trade off earnings for other job values. Or perhaps a present orientation makes it more likely that women will get pregnant unintentionally and that they exhibit low self-discipline at work, and the latter leads to lower wages. Any of these hypotheses involve some characteristic that is exogenous to both fertility and earnings affecting both and thereby creating a correlation between earnings and children that is not causal.
Past studies have dealt with this possible heterogeneity with explicit inclusion of control variables, or with fixed-effects models. All studies put in some control variables, but datasets lack measures of many relevant characteristics, such as taste for affluence or self-discipline. (Hill 1979 and Waldfogel 1998b used OLS regression with limited control variables.) We believe that the best available way to deal with heterogeneity on unmeasured characteristics is to combine inclusion of available control variables with person-specific fixed-effects modeling.
Three studies have used person fixed-effect models (Korenman and Neumark 1992 interacts with experience to create steeper wage trajectories rather than having a simple additive wage increment of a certain percent at every year, the coefficient purporting to represent effects of children on the log of wages would be biased. Another way that coefficients on motherhood could still be biased is if women decide to get pregnant when they can see a period of low wages coming (for example, if their industry or town is in recession). In this case the anticipated low wage would be causing the birth rather than the child causing the low wage. Yet such models are a vast improvement on OLS models in removing certain classes of bias from omitted variables.
Interactions with Marital Status and other Variables
We examine whether child penalties differ between married and unmarried mothers (dividing the latter into never married and divorced or separated). Most prior research has simply entered child status and marital status additively. Married mothers might be more able to spend time at home or to choose a more mother-friendly job, given another adult's income for support, leading to a higher penalty for married women. But, absent a sex-based division of market versus household labor, we might hypothesize the opposite, that married women have someone to share child rearing, and can better optimize earnings. Moreover, unmarried women with children may find that they can't make enough after childcare expenses to do better than welfare, and this could lead to a greater experience deficit for mothers relative to nonmothers among the unmarried. We might find no difference in penalty by motherhood status if employer discrimination were the mechanism, unless employers single out either married or unmarried mothers for discrimination. We will also examine interactions with race, and whether they result from race differences in marital status. Two past studies have found smaller penalties for Black than White women (Hill 1979; Waldfogel 1997) .
DATA, MEASURES, AND MODELS

Data
We pooled the 1982-1993 waves of the NLSY, a national probability sample of individuals aged 14 to 21 in 1979, with oversampling for Blacks and Latinos. 3 Respondents are interviewed annually. We limit the sample to women employed part-or full-time during at least two of the years 1982-1993, since fixed-effect models require at least two observations on each Quality of Employment Survey (Quinn and Staines 1979) . They were merged onto our data according to Census occupation codes.
Variables
The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wage in the respondent's current job.
We dropped person-years where hourly wages are outliers below $1.00 and above $200.00. The principal independent variable is the total number of children that a respondent had by the interview date of each year (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . In alternate specifications, we measure children with dummies for one child, two children, and three or more children (with no children as the reference category). Dummies for marital status treat "never married" as the reference category and include married and "divorced." (This last category actually includes divorced, separated, and widowed respondents, although in this young sample there were very few widows.)
Measures of human capital include education, years of full-time and part-time experience, and years of full-time and part-time seniority (i.e., experience in the organization for which one currently works). These measures include the entire life cycle back to 1978.
Experience includes seniority in one's present workplace. Finally, the total number of breaks in employment is included. A break is defined as time out of employment lasting longer than 6 weeks since one's first full-time job of at least 6 weeks in duration. Models controlling for human capital also include a measure of whether the respondent is currently enrolled in school since this is likely to affect employment and type of job.
We include a large number of job characteristics. A dummy variable is included for whether the respondent's current job is part-time, defined as less than 35 hours per week. (In results not shown we substituted hours per week and its square for the part-time dummy, and the coefficients for children were virtually unchanged.) Union status is a dummy variable for whether the respondent reported that wages in her job were set by collective bargaining. We include a dummy variable for working in the public sector (local, state, or federal government).
Another dummy indicates if the respondent's job is one of the two Census occupational titles for child care (child care worker, private household; other child care workers). Authority is a dummy variable giving a score of 1 to all Census detailed occupational categories with titles containing the words "management," "supervisor," or "foreman" (England 1992:137-39) .
We measure the cognitive skill demanded by an occupation with a scale created by England (1992:134-35) . It was created from a factor analysis of numerous items, mostly from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The score is merged onto NLSY respondents' records according to their detailed (1990) Census occupational category. Measures of job-specific training requirements (SVP), the physical strength demanded, and the physical hazards associated with one's occupation are occupational averages of variables taken from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, merged onto these data according to NLSY respondents' detailed occupation.
Finally, the occupational averages created from the QES by Randall Filer are included as continuous variables. Two were the measures discussed earlier used by Bielby and Bielby (1988) , measuring how much "effort they put into their jobs beyond what is required" and "how much effort, either physical or mental" their jobs require. The third is an anchored version of the second, it calibrates the second measure as a ratio to the amount of effort respondents said it takes to watch television. We also include two more indirect measures: percent of time spent not actually working (for example, waiting) while at work, and the percent time spent goofing off while at work.
The percent female in respondents' job in 1990 is calculated from 1990 Census data described above. It is the percent female of the persons employed in a cell of a matrix crossclassifying detailed 1990 3-digit occupational category with detailed 3-digit industry category.
A measure of the number of employees in the respondent's current work location is included to model the effects of firm size on the motherhood penalty. The NLSY began collecting data for this measure in 1986. Thus, we do not include this measure in our main models, but run a supplementary analysis on only those years for which we had this measure (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) .
A measure of time (minutes) spent commuting to one's current place of employment is included in one supplementary analysis. This variable is available only in the NLSY 1988 and 1993 surveys, so we do not include it in our main models, but in a supplementary analysis using only 1988 and 1993.
Statistical Models
We use fixed-effects regression models to analyze NLSY data arranged in a pooled timeseries cross-section with person-year as units of analysis. Effects are fixed for years and persons.
As discussed above, person fixed-effects eliminate omitted-variable bias created by the failure to include controls for unmeasured personal characteristics that have additive effects. Thus, fixedeffects models control for effects of unchanging aspects of intelligence, preferences resulting from early socialization, life cycle plans, tastes for affluence, future orientation, and unmeasured human capital. The model is: For all models, the Hausman test was conducted to assess whether random effects models were adequate. In each case, the test indicated a need for fixed-effects. We also present results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to allow comparison; since they presumably contain more omitted-variable bias, the comparison provides some insight into whether those who had (more) children have lower earning-potential based on their unobserved characteristics. Since the multiple observations on each individual are not independent, we use the Huber-White method to correct the standard errors in the OLS models (although we note that this correction never nontrivially changed standard errors). We place more confidence in fixedeffects models for causal inference.
We have not added Heckman-type selectivity corrections to our models. However, we note that if women for whom the motherhood penalty would be worst are the most likely to remain out of the labor force, our models will underestimate the motherhood penalty. [ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
RESULTS
Additive Effects of Motherhood and Causal Mechanisms
The models capturing the "gross" effect of motherhood have no controls, other than person-and year-specific fixed-effects. They indicate that the wage penalty for each child is 7 percent. Comparison of the fixed-effect and OLS models shows only a slightly higher gross penalty, 8 percent, in the OLS models. This suggests only slight negative selectivity into having (more) children on unmeasured pay-relevant characteristics.
4
Adding marital status to the model increases the estimated motherhood penalty slightly (by -.005 in fixed-effects models). Inspection of the full regression results (Appendix Table A -2) shows that marriage actually increases women's earnings, so it is a suppressor. These are average effects of marriage across child statuses; we will see below that children and marriage interact. Table 2 shows that reduced experience is clearly part of the explanation of the motherhood penalty, but not the whole story. In the "human capital models," we added education, full-and part-time seniority and experience, enrollment status, and number of breaks.
This reduces the child penalty by 36 percent, from about 7 percent to 5 percent.
5
We next explored whether something about the jobs held by mothers explains their lower wages. This would be true if mothers traded off wages for "mother-friendly" jobs, or if lowered productivity caused women to choose less demanding jobs. Or job characteristics could explain the motherhood penalty if employers engaged in discrimination against mothers, excluding them from high-paying jobs with demands they believed mothers would fulfill less well. Table 2 shows that the support for these ideas is very weak. Putting in all the job characteristics together lowers the (marriage and human capital-adjusted) penalty for each child from -.047 to -.037.
This is a 21 percent reduction, but a decline from a penalty of about 5 percent to about 4 percent seems small to us. The reduction in OLS models is even smaller. Moreover, half of the reduction in the fixed-effect model is achieved from simply adding a single job characteristic, whether the woman is working part-time. Working part-time reduces hourly pay, either directly or through forcing women into less desirable jobs that offer part-time hours.
No other job characteristic, when added alone to the human capital model, changes the child penalty to any nontrivial extent (results not shown). Mothers are less likely to be in jobs involving authority and more likely to work in jobs involving child care (Table 1) , but neither of these variables when added to the model reduces the child penalty by even a percentage point.
Controlling for the sex composition of the woman's job had no effect on the child penalty 5 OLS models show an even larger reduction in the child penalty when human capital is added (from 8 percent to 2 percent compared to from 7 percent to 5 percent in fixed-effects models). The larger drop in OLS suggests that some of the unobserved human capital difference between mothers and nonmothers is exogenous to both motherhood and measured human capital and affects each. Since this component is netted out of both the gross and human capital models under fixed-effects the motherhood coefficients differ less. What is odd is that in the models that control human capital, child coefficients are larger in fixed-effect than OLS models, whereas in gross models (results not shown). Although more female jobs pay less (Appendix Table A -2), mothers are no more likely to be in them (Table 1) . In fact, the zero-order correlation between number of children and the percent female of one's job is slightly negative (results not shown). Thus, there is no evidence that women select female jobs because they are more mother-friendly.
Occupational sex segregation and the wage penalty for working in a female job appear orthogonal to having children and the wage penalty for children.
We also experimented with adding groups of job variables at a time, but no picture emerged of any group of related variables that has a nontrivial effect on the child penalty. The five QES measures of effort required by the occupation do not change the penalty by even a percentage point. Also Table 1 shows similar means for mothers and nonmothers on these variables, and Table A -2 shows that all effort measures except "extra work effort" actually have negative effects on earnings! Similarly, if all the industry dummies are added to the human capital model, the child penalty is reduced by less than a percentage point.
We undertook two supplementary analyses adding job characteristics that were available only on certain years of the NLSY panel (results not shown). Limiting the analysis to just those years for which we had data on firm size (1986-1993) we found no change in the size of the child penalty with the addition of firm size. A second supplementary analysis assessed whether the child penalty arises because mothers sacrifice higher pay for a shorter commute. Since commuting time was only measured in 1989 and 1993, we ran fixed-effects models including those women employed in both 1989 and 1993. Adding commuting time to the human capital model had no effect on the estimated motherhood penalty.
the penalties were larger in OLS models. We have no ready explanation, and cannot compare to other studies since none provided both OLS and fixed-effects estimates for models both including and excluding human capital.
Given these weak results for job characteristics mediating the effect of motherhood on wages, we do not have to worry about whether any such indirect effect is because of voluntary selection of mother-friendly jobs, employer discrimination relegating mothers to worse jobs, or some other process. Motherhood does not seem to be having its effects through which jobs women hold, with the important exception of working part-time.
Table 3 presents our check on whether measuring "motherhood" with a continuous variable measuring number of children obscured nonlinear or nonmonotonic relationships. We measured children with three dummy variables (one child, two children, and three or more children), each relative to a reference category of no children. Table 3 shows that the gross penalty is 2 percent for one child, 13 percent for two children (i.e. an additional 11 percent for the second child), and 22 percent for three or more children. Controlling for marital status and human capital, the analogous penalties are 5 percent, 11 percent (an additional 6 percent for the second child), and 15 percent. As with the models entering number of children as a continuous variable, addition of job variables reduces the penalty a little. The penalty for one child is small, and none of it is explained by lost experience (the penalty goes up slightly in the human capitalcontrolled model). The second child has a much larger incremental effect than the first. Women may be more likely to take a break from employment when there are two children at home because the difference between their earnings and the costs of care for two children makes employment no longer compelling. But, this is far from the whole story, because most of the incremental loss in wage after the second child is present in the human capital model that controls for experience. Given that effects are at least monotonic if not perfectly linear, our judgment is that the imprecision introduced by measuring number of children continuously in our analyses is worth the gain in simplicity.
[ Table 3 about here]
Which Women Suffer Larger Child Penalties?
Next we consider interactions to investigate what characteristics of women or their jobs increase the size of motherhood penalties. Table 4 shows results from interacting dummies for marital status with number of children. The left column of Table 4 presents coefficients for total number of children, which, in this model including interactions, tell us the effect of each child on wages for never-married women. 6 The columns to the right present effects for married and divorced or separated women obtained by adding the coefficient on number of children and the coefficient on the relevant interaction. The fixed-effects models show that women who have never been married experience lower child penalties than married or divorced women, both before and after adding controls for human capital and job characteristics. 7 This result holds if we combine married and previously married women into one category (results not shown). In the OLS models, never-married women show child penalties as high or higher than in the fixedeffect models. We are more confident in the fixed-effects models for causal conclusions, particularly because in recent cohort women with more earning power are also more likely to marry, so fixed-effects modeling is especially needed to net out selectivity into marriage.
[ Table 4 about here]
What do we conclude from the fact that marriage increases the child penalty? It suggests that at least some part of the penalty arises because the ratio of time and energy mothers allocate to children versus jobs is affected by whether they have a source of financial support other than their own earnings. Without assuming a sex-based division of labor, it would not be clear the direction we would predict for this interaction. Husbands could, in principle, provide money that allows married mothers to focus more on their children than single women can; or they could provide another person to share child care, allowing married mothers to focus more on their jobs than single mothers. The higher child penalty for married mothers suggests that the sex division of labor predominates.
The higher penalty for married mothers also suggests that child penalties are not entirely a matter of discrimination against mothers, unless we believe that employers discriminate more against married than single mothers.
At first glance it is puzzling that married and divorced women both have similarly high child penalties. After all, divorced women do not have husbands to provide financial support and usually get relatively little child support. The similarity implies that the larger penalties experienced by married women are long lasting, enduring even if the marriage ends. Perhaps they operate through missed promotions, or cumulative impacts of impressions made or small raises earned early in one's employment history.
The fact that marriage increases the penalties for children does not imply that there is a marriage penalty. In fact, on average there is a marriage premium; marriage has a positive sign in all models that do not interact it with children (e.g. Table A -2). The interaction between marriage and children implies not only that the child penalty varies by marital status but also that the effect of marriage varies by child status. Calculations from Table 4 's (gross or human capital) models with interactions show that marriage has a wage premium for women with one child or less, and no effect for women with two children. But for women with more than two children, marriage has a net wage penalty. Thus, marriage worsens the child penalty, while children reduce the marriage premium, turning it to a penalty past two kids.
We undertook a number of analyses to get at the question of whether higher-level jobs penalize motherhood more. This might be true because they are organized on a more "male" model that penalizes anything that appears as less than full commitment, whether this affects productivity or not, or because their demanding nature means that anything less than full energy and attention affects productivity strongly. First we interacted human capital with number of children (results not shown). There was no interaction between years of education and number of children. We found that women with more full-time experience suffer larger child penalties, but the opposite was true for full-or part-time seniority. Thus, there is no clear evidence that more skilled or committed women experience higher penalties.
We interacted number of children with job characteristics (models included human capital measures as well). The child penalty is higher in full-time than part-time jobs. It is slightly lower in more heavily male jobs. Penalties were no higher in jobs requiring more onthe-job or vocational/professional training or more cognitive skill (they were trivially but significantly lower). Finally, we created a category intended to capture high level male jobs. We coded this dummy variable 1 if the job was classified as professional or management in Census broad categories and the job's percent female (of the occupation by industry category) was no more than 35 percent. We interacted this dummy variable with number of children in a model also controlling for marital status and human capital. These heavily male professional and managerial jobs actually had smaller (1 to 2 percentage point) child penalties. Thus, if anything it appears that high-level, male jobs penalize women a bit less for having children.
Finally, we considered whether child penalties differ by race. Limiting this analysis to Latinas, (non-Hispanic) Blacks, and (non-Hispanic) Whites, we interacted race with number of children (results not shown). Gross penalties for number of children did not differ by race. After adjusting for human capital, black/white penalties still did not differ, but Latinas had smaller penalties. When we used dummies for number of children, allowing nonlinear effects, it was only for three and more children that we found smaller penalties for Blacks and Latinas (whether human capital was controlled or not). Of course, most women have fewer than 3 children. There were no 3-way interactions between marital status, children, and race in any models, which implies that the lower penalties that women of color experience for third or higher parity births are not explained by more of their births being outside marriage. Waldfogel (1997) and Neumark and Korenman (1994) , using models that control for human capital, also report a smaller penalty for Black than White women in an earlier NLS data set. It is possible that, because minority women with three or more children are typically in the lowest paying jobs in the economy, the minimum wage puts a floor on the penalties that are possible.
CONCLUSIONS
We find a wage penalty for motherhood of approximately 7 percent per child among young American women. Roughly a third of the penalty is explained by past experience and seniority, including whether past work was part-time. That is, for some women, motherhood leads to employment breaks, part-time employment, and the accumulation of less experience and seniority, all of which diminish future earnings. However, it is striking that about two thirds of the child penalty remains after controlling for elaborate measures of experience.
We added numerous job characteristics to models to assess whether mothers earn less because their jobs are less demanding or offer mother-friendly characteristics. These factors had only a very small effect in explaining the child penalty, and about half of this came from a single job characteristic-whether the current job is part-time. Most job characteristics had no effect on the motherhood penalty--either because they don't affect pay, or because motherhood does not affect whether women hold these jobs. We need not be so concerned about the difficulty of whether a mediation of the penalty through job location should be interpreted as occurring because of choice of mother-friendly jobs or discriminatory placement of mothers since there is little evidence of such motherhood penalties being mediated through job placement.
In what social locations are motherhood penalties steepest? Black women and Latinas have smaller penalties, but only for third and higher births. Never-married women have lower penalties than married or divorced women. Second children reduce wages more than first children, especially for married women. There is no evidence that penalties are proportionately greater in more demanding or high-level jobs, or more "male" jobs, although they are higher for women who work full-time and already have more experience.
In sum, what conclusions can we make with some confidence, and what questions remain? Our use of fixed-effects modeling gives us some confidence that the effects of motherhood identified here are causal rather than spurious. Further, our detailed measures of experience make us confident that no more than one third of the motherhood penalty arises because motherhood interrupts women's employment, leading to breaks, more part-time work, and fewer years of experience and seniority. Finally, we find only a very small portion of the child penalty is explained by mothers' placement in jobs with characteristics associated with low pay. One caveat is that, while we had a large number of measures of job characteristics, we did not have direct measures of many of the characteristics that would make jobs easier to combine with parenting. Thus, it is possible that we have underestimated the importance of this factor.
For future research to be able to answer this question, and generalize to the nation, we need the inclusion of questions about job characteristics that accommodate parenting on national surveys using probability sampling, preferably panels.
What then explains the approximately two-thirds of the 7 percent per child penalty not explained by the reductions motherhood makes in women's job experience, if little of it is from working in less demanding or mother-friendly jobs? The remaining motherhood penalty of about 4 percent per child may arise from effects of motherhood on productivity and/or from employer discrimination. One of the real weaknesses of social science research is that we virtually never have direct measures of either productivity or discrimination, leaving us unable to choose between these two explanations. New approaches to measuring either productivity or discrimination would be a welcome contribution. In the meantime, we can glean hints from our analyses. We think that there is indirect evidence that at least part of the child penalty is a matter of job performance being affected by parenting such that mothers are less productive in a given hour of paid work, probably because they are more exhausted or distracted. Consider the facts that, net of human capital, women earn less with each subsequent child and children reduce pay more if they are married or divorced than never-married. It is plausible that employers discriminate against all women by treating them like mothers, or that they discriminate against all mothers relative to other women. But is it plausible that employers discriminate by number of children, and more against married mothers than single mothers (but give a premium for marriage when women have no or one child)? This is not impossible, but seems far fetched.
This does not mean that none of the child penalty is discriminatory. It may be that a base amount is discriminatory, and that the portion that is related to productivity is the portion that varies by number of children and marital status, because those factors affect decisions about how time and energy is allocated between child rearing and jobs.
How should public policy respond to penalties for motherhood? Because distinguishing between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory race and sex differences is institutionalized in our legal system, it is tempting to use an analogy here and conclude that a motherhood penalty is not of public concern unless it results from employers' discrimination. We don't know how much of the penalty arises from discrimination in the form of "differential treatment" of equivalently qualified and productive mothers and nonmothers. Nor do we know how many policies that have a disparate impact on mothers would fail the legal standard of being a "business necessity."
But we think that there is a serious equity problem even if the penalty were found to be entirely explained by mothers having less experience, lower productivity, and choosing mother-friendly jobs, and even if employers' policies had the intent and effect of doing nothing but maximizing output relative to costs. In short, we think there is a serious equity problem when we all free ride on the benefits of mothers' labor, while mothers bear much of the costs of rearing children. At this point we depart from the narrow scientific analysis, and articulate our findings with a normatively based notion of equity.
Reducing the extent to which mothers bear the costs of rearing children is a worthy goal, in our view. Broadening the concept of discrimination to include anything about how jobs are structured or what is rewarded that has a disparate impact on mothers, and making employers change such policies would be one way to approach this. But should employers have to get rid of any policy that penalizes mothers? We suspect that it would reduce net output of employing organizations to restructure work not to have a motherhood penalty, since some of what would need to be changed is policies that reward experienced workers and those who work long hours with high energy whenever needed by the employer. Of course, the net effect on output is an empirical question; in some cases the productivity gains from increased morale and continuity of mothers' employment would offset costs. But if there are costs to employers of restructuring work to eliminate the motherhood penalty, deciding who should pay them is just one part of the larger question of who should bear the costs of raising the next generation. We suggest the general equity principle that those who receive benefits should share in the costs. As Marxist feminists pointed out in the 1970s, capitalist employers benefit from the unpaid work of mothers, who raise the next generation of workers. But employers are not the only ones who benefit when children are well reared. The free riders on mothers' labor include all of us. Thus, mandating that employers share in these costs makes most sense as one part of a broader redistribution of the costs of child rearing.
Those who rear children deserve public support precisely because the benefits of child rearing diffuse broadly to other members of the society. Indeed, we believe that child rearing (whether unpaid or paid), broadly construed, creates more diffuse social benefits than most kinds of work. In our view, the equitable solution is to collectivize the costs of child rearing broadly 36 because the benefits diffuse broadly. While most mothers are employed today, mothers still bear the lionshare of the costs of rearing children. This is true in every society, but other industrial democracies have collectivized the costs to a much greater extent than the U.S. (albeit often with other, pronatalist, motivations). Costs are socialized through family allowances, child care, and medical care that are financed by progressive taxes. Adding such policies in the U.S. would not eliminate the fact that motherhood lowers wages, although it might reduce some of the gross effect if subsidized child care increased women's employment. Such policies would put a floor under the poverty of families with mothers, and would redistribute resources toward those who now pay a disproportionate share of the costs of rearing children. In a period when most mothers are employed, welfare mothers are being required to take jobs, and the economy is generating budget surpluses unthinkable a decade ago, there might be a political opening for creative proposals that would increase equity for mothers while also helping children. a Measures of human capital are education, full-time seniority, part-time seniority, full-time experience, part-time experience, number of breaks in employment, and whether currently enrolled in school.
b Job characteristics include the QES and DOT measures listed in Table 1 , whether the current job is part-time, percent female of the respondents' occupation by industry category, dummies for whether the job is in government, unionized, in a child care occupation, or self-employment, and industry dummies. a Measures of human capital are education, full-time seniority, part-time seniority, full-time experience, part-time experience, number of breaks in employment, and whether currently enrolled in school.
b Job characteristics include the QES and DOT measures listed in Table 1 , whether the current job is part-time, percent female of the respondents' occupation by industry category, dummies for whether the job is in government, unionized, in a child care occupation, or self-employment, and industry dummies. 
Notes:
All models include the variables included in the model above and have Ns from Table 1 . OLS models include age and year, each in linear, squared, and cubed form. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Effect sizes are calculated from unstandardized coefficients in models containing interactions between marital status and number of children. Standard errors in OLS models were corrected using the Huber-White method.
a Measures of human capital are education, full-time seniority, part-time seniority, full-time experience, part-time experience, number of breaks in employment, and whether currently enrolled in school.
APPENDIX
Source: NLSY (1982-1993).
Notes:
All models include the variables included in the model above and have Ns from Table 1 . OLS models include age and year, each in linear, squared, and cubed form. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Effect sizes are calculated from unstandardized coefficients in models containing interactions between marital status and dummies for number of children. Standard errors in OLS models were corrected using the Huber-White method.
b Job characteristics include the QES and DOT measures listed in Table 1 , whether the current job is part-time, percent female of the respondents' occupation by industry category, dummies for whether the job is in government, unionized, in a child care occupation, or self-employment, and industry dummies. Notes: Age is not included in fixed-effects models, but is implicitly controlled because period is controlled, the person-fixed-effects net out cohort, and period and cohort together uniquely determine age. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in OLS models were corrected using the Huber-White method.
